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Short abstract: 
We suggest that speakers can communicate the source of their uncertainty by framing their 
prediction with either a personal mode “I am uncertain that the team will win” or with an impersonal 
mode “It is uncertain that the team will win”. We studied the effect of such mode on how recipients 
judge the prediction. We found that participants judged impersonal prediction more informative, and 
more based on statistical information than personal prediction. In addition participants were more 
willing to bet according to impersonal prediction.  Findings support the existence of variants of 
uncertainty and that uncertain claims convey more than a probability. 
Long abstract:  The present research focuses on how uncertainties are communicated, understood 
and used. From a mathematical point of view, uncertainty can be described by numerical 
probabilities: numbers ranging from 0 (impossible) to 1.0 (full certainty). Yet uncertainty cannot be 
reduced to a point on an axis and can be characterized as well by its source. Indeed uncertainty could 
stem from lack of knowledge (i.e., ignorance) or from the character of events themselves (i.e., 
disposition of the world). As numerical probabilities, quantifiers of the natural language (e.g., there is 
a chance, it is almost certain) can convey different ranges of uncertainty. We suggest that these 
terms could reflect the source of uncertainty by means of the pronoun used to describe the 
uncertain state. For example one can say “I am uncertain” reflecting an internal uncertainty, whereas 
someone else can prefer “it is uncertain”, reflecting an uncertainty attributed to the world.  
We conducted two experiments to explore how the personal and the impersonal modes of 
predictions (I am uncertain vs., It is uncertain) are perceived by the recipients and influence their 
subsequent decision making in a context of soccer game prediction. In the first experience 246 
participants, non-experts on soccer, read a prediction about a match outcome and then judged its 
informativeness, the degree and nature of knowledge of the speaker (statistics or not), the attitude 
of the speaker towards the team and finally, their own willingness to bet. In a mixed design, the 
degree of certainty of the prediction was a within-subjects factor (low, moderate vs. high probability 
of occurrence) and the mode of prediction (personal vs. impersonal) was a between-subjects factor. 
Results indicated that predictions communicating moderate degrees of certainty (i.e., not certain) 
were perceived as less informative and less based on statistics than low and high ones (i.e., very 
uncertain and almost certain).  Likewise, moderate probability terms were less encouraging to bet 
than low and high ones. The mode of prediction did not influence the perceived degree of 
uncertainty. However, impersonal predictions (e.g., “It is almost certain that Hoffenheim will win”) 
were perceived as more based on statistical information than personal ones (e.g., “I am almost 
certain that Hoffenheim will win). We found an interaction between mode and certainty degree 
showing that impersonal predictions were judged more informative when they conveyed a low 
degree of certainty. Finally, participants were more willing to bet on the impersonal predictions 
rather than on personal ones.  In the second experiment (forthcoming results) we manipulated in 
addition the expertise of the speaker. We hypothesized that the degree of expertise of the speaker 
will moderate the effect of the mode of prediction on judgments and decision to bet. We also asked 
participants about the correctness of the prediction and the degree of responsibility if one bets as a 
function of the prediction and wins. Finally, we asked participants to give a reason supporting the 
prediction, in order to study which kind of reasons the different modes elicit (e.g., statistical reasons 
or causal one).  
The source of certainty manipulated by means of the personal pronoun influences the inference 
drawn by the hearer on the speaker’s knowledge and was consequently found to influence decision 
making. These results show the need to take into account different dimensions of uncertainty, such 
as the attribution of its source, and to not consider uncertainty along the single probability 
frequentistically based dimension. Results will be discussed in the light of the phenomenological 
analysis of the variants of uncertainty. 
